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I. INTRODUCTION
At a recent breakfast with CLO’s, one of which is the CLO of one
of the biggest manufacturers of wind parks — a firm which exports
all over the world, especially in Asia. He commented that most
parties were proposing mediation clauses, and subsidiary submission
to local courts, without an arbitration alternative.
Arbitration has been a success. It is the predominant dispute
resolution procedure in international trade. It has conquered new
territories in the area of investment protection. But we cannot rest on
our historic laurels. The world is changing at terrifying speed, and
international arbitration can only exist if it is the preferred solution
chosen by companies and states.
You may be thinking that I will now refer to cost and time. Not at
all. That is stale bread. My worry is not time and cost; my worry is
the lack of trust — the lack of trust in the decisions issued by
arbitrators. If companies and states lose that confidence, arbitration is
doomed. Users are prepared to pay, and they are prepared to wait.
But they are not prepared to pay and wait for an adjudication that
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they distrust.
This brings me to the two salient issues I want to address: the first
is openness and the second is the participation of parties in the
designation of arbitrators.

II. OPENNESS
It is undisputed that we live in a more transparent world. Citizens
everywhere insist on knowledge — transparency is the guardian of
liberty. Freedom of arbitration acts have revolutionized citizens’
knowledge of how their state is run. Technology has reinforced the
trend: the cost of disseminating and acquiring information has
dropped to close to nil.
The new openness has created a schizophrenic situation in
arbitration. In investment arbitration the general rule now is total
openness (cases, hearings, decisions are now public). In commercial
arbitration the status quo is unmovable, and total secrecy the norm
(the existence of the case, the people designated as arbitrators, and
their decision: all is secret). There has been no change in commercial
arbitration whatsoever in the last fifty years!
The situation is untenable. I submit that a fundamental change
regarding transparency is required. Arbitral institutions should
publish a list with the procedure they manage and which the
arbitrators they designate — as ICSID does. I do not care about the
name of the parties, but the names of the arbitrators should be public.
Commercial awards should be published as a general rule, except if
the parties have agreed otherwise or the institution so decides. The
names of parties should be deleted, but name of arbitrators should be
public.
Publicity is one of the basic pillars of justice. As Bentham said,
“Publicity is the very soul of justice. It is the keenest spur to exertion
and the surest of all guards against improbity. It keeps the judge
himself while trying under trial.”1 It is essential that arbitrators know
that their findings and arguments will be picked apart by lawyers,
academics, futures clients — that what and how they decide will
have an impact on their reputation. Publicity is a prime instrument of
1. THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 316 (John Bowring ed., 1843).
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quality control.
The perceived and real lack of transparency is a shortcoming of
international arbitration and it is a contributing factor in limiting its
appeal — especially outside the First World. The Financial Times
referred on April 15, 2010 to the “secretive world of international
arbitration”2 — this does not increase users’ confidence in the
institution. And secrecy creates a false perception: arbitration is in
general terms an impartial and fair system of adjudication. I have
never come across any malfeasance. There is nothing to hide. But we
act as if there indeed is something to hide, and in the process we
undermine the legitimacy of the institution. More openness would
also increase the possibilities of new entrants into the systems, as
lawyers and arbitrators.
Let’s look at the disadvantages. There is the argument that users
want secrecy, that confidentiality is the main advantage of
arbitration. In a survey in 2003 the AAA found that only 10% of
users thought confidentiality as relevant.3 In shipping arbitration, all
awards are published. Secrecy is not important for clients — and
when it really is, there should be an opt out. In my opinion,
confidentiality is a self-serving myth. I submit that confidentiality is
a protection basically for arbitrators and possibly also for lawyers. It
is a protection for arbitrators and lawyers trying to avoid public
scrutiny of their work.

III.PARTICIPATION OF PARTIES IN THE
DESIGNATION OF ARBITRATORS
It is important that parties participate in the designation of
arbitrators. Judges are civil servants, designated in accordance with
an objective procedure established by law. Arbitrators should be
chosen and designated by the parties. This is fundamental for the
confidence in the final decision.
The lack of openness creates its own problems: while in
investment arbitration parties can chose knowing all the previous
decisions of an arbitrator, in commercial arbitration there is very
2. Michael Peele & Jane Croft, Arbitration: Case Closed, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 15,
2010, http://ft.com/cms/s/0/1858447c-48be-11df-8af4-00144feab49a.html.
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little guidance regarding the candidates’ record. But there is a
second, much more fundamental problem. In the traditional system,
used by most institutions, each party has a total freedom in selecting
an arbitrator. And the two co-arbitrators then elect the chairman, or,
if they cannot agree, the designation is made by the institution or
appointing authority.
Formally, all three arbitrators must have the same level of
impartiality and independence. But this is a farce. As Martin Hunter
famously said in a classic quote: “What I am really looking for in a
party nominated arbitrator is someone with the maximum
predisposition towards my client but with the minimum appearance
of bias.”4
Parties have no interest to appoint truly impartial and independent
arbitrators. They are subject to the well-known prisoner’s dilemma: a
classic game developed in 1950’s by American mathematician Albert
Tucker. Two prisoners are interrogated separately. If both keep quiet,
they will be freed. If one confesses, the other will be jailed and he
will be free. But if both confess, both will be jailed. This is a
situation where the outcome depends not only from your own
behavior, but also from that of the counterparty. There is an amazing
result: rational behavior leads both prisoners to confess — while by
both simply shutting up, they would have avoided jail!
The situation is analogous in arbitration.
• Both parties could choose impartial arbitrators: the result
would be that fair justice is done
•

But if claimant does, and the respondent chooses a partial
arbitrator, respondent will be privileged (he has an
unashamed defender on the tribunal, while claimant does
not)

•

The prisoners’ dilemma will push the claimant to be
cautious and to select someone who, appearing to be
impartial, in fact is as close as possible to the claimant’s
case. And the respondent will do the same.5

4. Martin Hunter, Ethics of the International Arbitrator, 53 ARBITRATION
222-23 (1987).
5. See, e.g., Peter Rees Shell’s General Counsel (speaking at the Institute of
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Party appointed arbitrators lead to situations which can only be
described as miscarriages of justice and which undermine the
legitimacy of arbitration. Here are some examples:
•

The party appointed arbitrator who impromptu stands up
and interrupts the opposing party lawyer to make a
passionate plaidoyer
• The party appointed arbitrator who writes a 140 page
dissenting opinion, stating why the award is null and void,
procrastinates delivery for months and runs a huge bill
• The party appointed arbitrator who then drafts the request
for annulment of the award before the courts
• The party appointed arbitrator, who initially accepts the
decision against the state which appointed him, and then
changes his opinion and candidly admits that he wants to be
able to return to his country
• The party appointed arbitrator who is caught sending emails
to the party who appointed him, describing the minutiae of
the deliberations
Paulsson tells the story of the U.S. appointee to the Loewen
tribunal, who afterwards acknowledged in public that he had been
put under severe pressure by officials from the U.S. Department of
Justice.6
How can parties trust an adjudication system which permits this
type of behavior by the very persons who are designated to decide
the dispute? And whose decision as to the merits is final and
binding?
But the present system has a further — and in my opinion fatal —
disadvantage: parties have a 100% capacity to influence the party
appointed arbitrators and 0% capacity to influence the designation of
the chairman by the institution. If there is no agreement, the
institution will designated the person of its choosing, without taking
Energy Law’s European Conference): “Picking your own arbitrator is a massively
overrated advantage of arbitration – because the corollary of being able to pick
your own arbitrator is that so can the guy on the other side.”
6. David Schneiderman, Judicial Politics and International Investment
Arbitration: Seeking an Explanation for Conflicting Outcomes.
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into account the parties’ preferences. So that parties can end up with
the following: (1) with a party appointed arbitrator, whom they really
like, because he or she is formally impartial, but in his heart he is a
known defender of the party’s thesis; (2) with a party who is set-off
by an arbitrator designated by the other party, who meets exactly the
same conditions; and (3) and with a chairman, who in the end is the
one who will decide, who has been chosen by the institution, without
any participation of the party, and who may for some objective
reason be actively disliked by the party. The net result is that the
present system does not really guarantee party involvement in the
designation of the deciding arbitrator.

IV.CONCLUSION
What is the solution? We must move away from party appointed
arbitrators Respect for party autonomy must be the first rule: parties
should be free to agree party appointed arbitrators — but they should
do so expressly. The default rule should be different: all
appointments should be made by the institutions.
Paulsson has proposed that arbitral institutions should have closed
lists of candidates. I have misgivings. It could lead to a closed, elitist
coterie.
The basic guideline is parties should be heard and should have a
say because we are providing service and the voice of the client is
basic. In other words, substitute the right of arbitrary appointment of
one arbitrator with the right to veto all three candidates. There are
various formulae. Each institution can develop its model.

